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Abstract 
The European consolidation process has raised a few questions. The most frequent one has 
been how large are the costs of consolidation and has the Eurozone fiscal stance improved 
or achieved debt sustainability? Second, do these costs and sustainability depend on the 
composition (tax vs. spending) of the consolidation process? Third, do risk premia matter? 
Fourth, which of the two following strategies, backloading vs. frontloading, is superior to 
the other? The aim of the paper is to shed light on these questions using a multi-country 
reduced-form model. It considers explicitly that the Eurozone member states are facing a 
dual trade-off, first between labor market outcomes of consolidation and public debt 
dynamics and, second, between reducing public expenditures and increasing taxes. The 
main conclusion is that a tax-based backloaded consolidation is superior to all other 
strategies, be they spending-based or frontloaded, or both. Introducing risk premia 
endogenously does not alter the conclusion. 
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1. Introduction 
After a short period of expansionary fiscal policy in 2008-2009, most Euro area 
countries reversed the fiscal stance and entered into a period of fiscal consolidation. 
Austerity was notably required to comply with the 3%-of-GDP rule, enshrined in the 
Stability and Growth Pact and reinforced after the adoption of the Treaty on stability, 
coordination and governance. Besides, the outbreak of the Greek crisis in late 2009 created 
fears of a possible sovereign default and contagion among Eurozone member states, 
leading to a panic-driven austerity as described by De Grauwe and Ji (2013).  
It has been obvious that substantial domestic austerity measures coupled with a 
synchronised wave of fiscal consolidation in the Eurozone since 2011 have had a strong 
negative impact on growth that paved the way for a double-dip recession. The fact that 
fiscal consolidation has been implemented though the output gap had not yet recovered 
from the recession has made the former more costly and even self-defeating, like in Greece. 
A new consensus had indeed emerged about the size of fiscal multipliers since the Great 
Recession and they are now supposed to be time-varying and higher in time of crisis. The 
consolidation process has thus raised a few questions. The most frequent one has been how 
large are the costs of consolidation and has the Eurozone fiscal stance improved or achieved 
debt sustainability? Second, do these costs and sustainability depend on the composition 
(tax vs. spending) of the consolidation process? Third, do risk premia matter? Fourth, taking 
into account risk premia, which strategy among the following two, backloading vs. 
frontloading, can achieve the sharpest reduction in European public debts at the lowest real 
cost? The aim of the present paper is precisely to deal with these issues. It considers 
explicitly that the Eurozone member states have been facing a dual trade-off, first between 
labour market outcomes of consolidation and public debt dynamics and, second, between 
reducing public expenditures and increasing taxes. 
According to the first trade-off, the frontloading strategy has relied on the argument 
that the gains from consolidation in terms of lower debt and interest rates have outweighed 
the costs in terms of lower activity and higher unemployment. Nevertheless, the size of the 
impact of fiscal consolidation on long-term interest rates remains disputable. This point is 
investigated in this paper.  
According to the second trade-off, the fiscal multiplier effect is often shown stronger 
after a spending cut than after a tax hike. Nevertheless, in the consolidation context, 
political economy arguments can help to explain why spending cuts are more frequent 
than tax hikes. Moreover, public expenditures like investment are less visible to the public in 
the short run than some others and can be cut without short-run social costs1. The impact 
of the composition effect will be investigated in this paper, on a country basis. Once all 
Eurozone countries are included, and their composition effect characterized, it is possible to 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Balassone and Franco (2000).  
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compare the output outcomes of consolidation plans with different compositions of the 
fiscal effort. Thus the cost of spending-driven consolidation is assessed.  
To investigate this dual trade-off, we extend the simple reduced-form model of 11 
Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) developed in Blot et al. (2014a). The model is sufficiently 
detailed to explicitly link all macro elements of debt sustainability and output dynamics, the 
composition effects and the external trade linkages. The model also includes time-varying 
fiscal multipliers in a dynamic macroeconomic model and assesses their consequence in 
terms of public debt sustainability and real costs of consolidation. It is important to 
acknowledge that debates continue about the value of multipliers, the evaluation of recent 
output gaps, and hysteresis effects. For these reasons, the choice of a reduced-form model 
makes it possible, after some changes in the parameters, to conduct a large array of a 
sensitivity tests. Finally, the model also addresses the question of the optimal fiscal stance, 
defined as the fiscal consolidation producing the smallest real costs and achieving 
meanwhile public finance sustainability. The international dimension of the model also 
makes it possible to account for the interdependencies between Eurozone member states.  
2. A brief and selective literature review  
We mobilise two types of literature: the frontloading vs. backloading and the 
composition effect. The former depends extensively on the multiplier effect. In a chapter of 
the World Economic Outlook (2010), the IMF had concluded early that the costs of fiscal 
consolidation would be important, though not substantial. A fiscal multiplier around 0.5 
was found at this time. In 2012 however, in the new issue of the Outlook, the tone was 
radically different. Assertions were made that fiscal multipliers had been formerly 
underestimated and were in a range of [0.9;1.7]. Blanchard and Leigh (2013), in a sequel of 
their box in WEO 2012, acknowledged that during downturns, fiscal multipliers were 
certainly above unity. While the former value of the fiscal multiplier urged a frontloading 
strategy, the latest one rather urged a backloading one. As a matter of fact, the growing 
body of evidence on the time-varying properties of the fiscal multiplier along the business 
cycle highlighted the importance in the timing of fiscal consolidation: a frontloading 
strategy when the output gap was widely and negatively open would become a “self-
defeating strategy” (Holland and Portes, 2012). Not only would there be large real incurred 
costs but the debt to GDP ratio would not fall and debt sustainability would recede.  
We have reviewed elsewhere the body of evidence on time-varying fiscal multipliers 
(Blot et al., 2014b). The list of factors which make the fiscal multiplier non-linear includes 
the zero-lower bound (e.g. Eggertsson, 2010), financial stress for households and firms (e.g. 
Corsetti et al., 2012), unemployment and the business cycle (e.g. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012), and public debt thresholds (Corsetti et al., 2013). A general 
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conclusion of this literature is that the fiscal multiplier is higher in times of crisis than in 
good times (see the recent meta-analysis by Gechert and Rannenberg, 2014).  
As regards the composition effect, the seminal contribution of Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) concluded that spending-based consolidation had smaller adverse effects than tax-
based consolidation. Stated differently, the spending multiplier appeared smaller than the 
tax multiplier. While Erceg and Lindé (2012) achieve a similar result in a two-country 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with independent monetary policy, 
they obtain the contrary once they introduce either a monetary union or a zero-lower-
bound on monetary policy. Their argument is that spending cuts require sharp falls in 
interest and exchange rates to crowd-in private demand. In a monetary union and under 
the ZLB, both channels disappear and a spending-based consolidation is costlier than a tax-
based one. This is consistent with the empirical findings of, e.g. Batini et al. (2012) who 
conclude that spending multipliers are significantly larger than tax multipliers during 
downturns. According to Gechert and Rannenberg (2014, baseline estimation, figure 2), 
the tax multiplier is only weakly different between downturns and upturns, whereas the 
spending multiplier can be multiplied by 3; during downturns, the spending multiplier can 
therefore be on average 5 times higher than the tax multiplier. in’t Veld (2013), with 
consideration of spillover effects of fiscal consolidation in the Eurozone, and Coenen et al. 
(2012), without consideration for the time-varying property of fiscal multipliers, also 
showed that spending multipliers were higher than tax multipliers.   
3. Presentation of the model  
We extend the model developed in Blot et al. (2014a) to account for a composition 
effect of the fiscal stance. The model is a simple macroeconomic framework combining 
structural and reduced-form non-linear equations. It is able to embrace alternative insights 
of the literature, including time-varying fiscal multipliers and hysteresis effects. It remains 
tractable for a large set of Eurozone countries and calibrations are consistent with actual 
data. Thanks to tractability, we can model supply and demand complex mechanisms which 
are possibly heterogeneous across countries. The model is also able to make a large set of 
sensitivity analyses which give rise to different scenarios.  
In contrast with DSGE models, this reduced-form model does not derive from optimal 
behaviours. It remains that, despite optimization, DSGE models are not devoid of strong 
assumptions, be it e.g. on the properties of households (which part of them is liquidity 
constrained? which part is not? The answer to these questions is important because it has 
implications on the effectiveness of fiscal policy)2 or on expectations, which are often 
forward-looking though a mix of backward-looking and forward-looking expectations 
                                                          
2 See for example Wieland et al. (2012) for a comparison of fiscal policy effects on output gap for a large set of 
DSGE models.  
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might be preferred, or alternative approaches to expectations like those discussed by 
Woodford (2013). Moreover, these models generally do not allow to model nonlinearities 
such as variable fiscal multipliers over the business cycle, because they are linearized around 
a single point3, or to model hysteresis effects which mean that the steady-state (potential) 
output changes over time.  
The key features of the model are that it allows for an explicit representation of the 
main countries of the Eurozone: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. An aggregated Eurozone is also computed 
in order to deal with global analysis and monetary policy. On the demand side, an open 
economy aggregate demand function is modelled which depends on fiscal and monetary 
policies, external demand (a channel for intra EU interdependencies) as well as exogenous 
shocks on the output gap. Hysteresis effects are introduced but they only affect the level of 
output in the long run whereas the growth rate of the potential output reverts to baseline 
path. External demand is represented using a bilateral trade matrix taking into account 
interdependencies between Eurozone countries. Prices are given by a Phillips curve relating 
current inflation to expected inflation, economic activity, imported inflation and exogenous 
shocks. Expectations are supposed to be backward-looking4. A non-linear Taylor rule is used 
to set the stance of monetary policy. Fiscal balance is the sum of interest payments, 
cyclically-adjusted balance and cyclical components. This simple definition helps to properly 
assess the fiscal stance, i.e. the part of fiscal policy which is under the direct control (or 
discretion) of current governments. We disentangle between fiscal impulses based on 
expenditures and taxes. The focus is also put on the time-varying dimension of the fiscal 
multiplier. The model allows to compute public debt projections for Eurozone countries, 
taking into account the impact of the market interest rate (government-bond yield), and to 
assess debt sustainability. A risk-premium on long-term public interest rates is also 
introduced. It depends on public debt and the structural primary balance.  
3.1. A simple model for open economies 
To sum up, the model may boil down to 4 main equations describing demand5, 
potential output, inflation and long-term interest as a weighted sum of future short-term 
interest rates. The output gap (𝑦) (defined as the difference between current output (𝑦�) 
and potential output (𝑦∗)) is given by the following equation: 
(1) 𝑦 = 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐺 + 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑇 + 𝛿𝑙 . (𝑅 − 𝑅�) + 𝛽𝑙 .𝑎𝑎 
                                                          
3 Recent exceptions are papers by in’t Veld (2013) drawing on a structural multi-country model and Bi et al. (2013) 
drawing on a small, open economy, DSGE model. 
4 More precisely, expected inflation depends on the gap between past inflation and the inflation target. 
5 More details on the equations of the model are described in Blot et al. (2014a), as major changes stem from the 
introduction of a composition effect of the fiscal multiplier. 
  6 
It is the driven by the usual variables, like real interest rates, external demand and fiscal 
policy, which is captured here by by 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐺  and 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑇 , the effective fiscal impulses, 
cumulating past and current ex ante fiscal impulses on public expenditures and taxes.6 𝑅 is 
the long term real interest rate and  𝑅� is the long run equilibrium value of interest rate. The 
term 𝛿𝑙 . (𝑅 − 𝑅�) captures the effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand via its impact 
on financial markets and expectations of future inflation. The term ( 𝛽𝑙 .𝑎𝑎) stands for the 
impact of external demand by trade partners. The dynamics of the current level of output is 
represented by an error correction equation. Yet, with a large negative output gap, the 
error correction model implies growth rates which can be very large and unrealistic. 
Therefore, a 2.5%7 ad-hoc restriction is introduced in the dynamics of current output. 
The dynamics of the potential output is described by the following equation: 
(2) 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝑦𝑡−1∗ + 𝐻. 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝑠 
where 𝐻 is an hysteresis parameter and 𝜀𝑡
𝑠 is an exogenous shock on aggregate supply. 
GDP prices are set according to a New Keynesian hybrid Phillips curve. Inflation depends on 
past inflation, expected inflation, output gap, and imported inflation and we rely on 
estimates by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Rudd and Whelan (2006), and Paloviita (2008) for 
calibration: 
(3) 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜂1.𝜋𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜂1).𝜋𝑡+1𝑒 + 𝜂2.𝑦𝑡+𝜂3.∑ 𝑤𝑚,𝑗,𝑐(𝛥𝜋𝑡𝑐)𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡𝜋 
Actually, a distinction is made between short-term (or one-period ahead forecast) 
entering the Phillips curve equation (3) and long-term forecasts, which is used for the long 
term real interest rate. For one-period ahead forecasts (𝜋𝑡𝑒), we rely on backward-looking 
expectations, and we assume that inflation is expected to converge to the ECB target at a 
given speed. For financial markets, long-run expected inflation is modelled as the 
discounted sum of forward-looking inflation rates, in a similar fashion as nominal long-term 
rates, in order to keep expectations consistent at this (more than one-year ahead) horizon.  
Monetary policy is described through a non-linear Taylor rule where, under non-ZLB 
circumstances, the short term interest rate moves with the gap between Eurozone inflation 
𝜋𝑡
𝐸𝐸 and the ECB target 𝜋∗ on the one hand, and with the Eurozone output gap 𝑦𝑡𝐸𝐸 on the 
other hand. The ZLB is fixed at 0 %. According to the expectations theory, the long term 
interest rate for German public bonds is set equal to the expected sum of future short term 
interest rates for which expectations are supposed to be rational (following Shiller, 1979). 
                                                          
6 It is an ex ante multiplier in the sense that it does not take into account monetary policy effects and spillover 
effects from external trade on GDP. 
7 It does not imply that growth rate is strictly bounded at 2.5% during a recovery since short-term dynamics 
resulting from monetary and fiscal policy or external demand can also drive growth.  
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(4) 𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑇𝑇 = 𝑟∗ + 𝜋𝑡𝐸𝐸 + 𝛹1. (𝜋𝑡𝐸𝐸 − 𝜋∗) + 𝛹2.𝑦𝑡𝐸𝐸 
The long-term public may include a risk premium 𝜀𝑡
𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑝. It is supposed to be equal to 
zero in the baseline scenario where we consider that long term interest rates all converge as 
observed in the pre-crisis period. A sensitivity analysis accounts for an endogenous linear 
risk premium, increasing with public debt. The assumption that the risk premium is 
sensitive to public debt rather than deficits is consistent with results reported by Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2013) after 2008. The risk premium is zero when public debt is below 60% and 
when the country reaches a structural primary balance which stabilizes debt.  
(5) 𝜀𝑡
𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜅𝐵𝑡   if 𝐵𝑡−1 > 60% and if 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 < 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡������ 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡������ is the primary structural balance stabilizing public debt. It must be noticed that 
for countries that entered the EFSF, the long term interest rate is supposed to be 
exogenous. The real long term interest rate, entering equation (1) is equal to the nominal 
long term rate minus long run expected inflation. 
Finally, imports of each country increase with the output gap (eq.(6)). Then, as imports 
in each country are exports for other countries, we define external demand to country c as 
the weighted sum of imports of the other EMU countries (eq.(7)). As the model considers 
only Eurozone countries, the external demand only accounts for intra-Eurozone trade.  
(6) 𝑚𝑡 = 𝛺. 𝑦𝑡 
(7) 𝑎𝑎𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚,𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑡𝑗  
Calibration of the model is described in the appendix.  
3.2. Public finances and fiscal policy 
The fiscal block of the model includes public debt dynamics and hinges extensively on 
the structural primary balance. The latter evolves according to the differentiated impulses 
on public spending (𝐸𝐼𝐺) and taxes (𝐸𝐼𝑇) but also according to changes in taxes which are 
due to variations in the gap between potential production and the baseline. As a matter of 
fact, a permanent downward shift in potential output relative to the baseline entails a 
permanent fall in taxes, then a permanent fall in the structural primary balance. The cyclical 
balance depends on the overall sensitivity of revenues and expenditures to the business 
cycle. The average interest rate on debt evolves according to the long term nominal interest 
rate on newly issued public bonds.  
The impact of fiscal policy depends on the state of the economy as emphasized by the 
growing literature surveyed by Parker (2011). Hence, we build a time-varying fiscal 
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multipliers 𝜇𝑡 which depends on the output gap and on the composition of the adjustment. 
Tax-based and spending-based multipliers can be described by the illustrative figure 2. We 
consider the same shape for the two fiscal multipliers. Yet 𝜇𝑚𝑇𝑚𝑇  (respectively 𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑇  and 𝜇0𝑇 ) 
may differ from 𝜇𝑚𝑇𝑚𝐺  (respectively 𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝐺  and 𝜇0
𝐺  ). The calibrated values for the fiscal 
multipliers are based on the meta-regression analysis provided by Gechert and Rannenberg 
(2014) where they show that the spending-based multiplier is very sensitive to the state of 
the economy whereas the tax-based multiplier is flatter. 
The values of fiscal (tax and spending) multipliers are maximal in very bad times, 
whereas they are minimal in very good times. Such a representation of the fiscal multiplier 
does not directly account for all the possibilities highlighted in the empirical literature. Yet, 
as monetary policy is endogenous and constrained by the zero lower bound, the effect of 
fiscal policy becomes stronger when the output gap is negative and monetary policy 
constrained by the ZLB since there is no increase in the interest rate that can mitigate the 
impact of fiscal policy. Since the banking sector is not represented in the model, the state of 
the financial system has no incidence on the fiscal multiplier8. Nevertheless, we may 
suppose that a situation of distressed banking system would be accompanied by a negative 
output gap, a feature which is explicitly introduced in the model via the time-varying 
nature of the fiscal multiplier. Besides, fiscal multipliers are higher when the unemployment 
rate is high as liquidity constraints become more stringent for firms and households. In such 
a case, the Ricardian hypothesis does not hold. Finally, there is one situation that seems to 
be more controversial if public debt is high or increases quickly: Corsetti et al. (2013) argue 
that the fiscal multiplier would be low. The analyses will yet also include a situation where a 
risk premium in the interest rate increases with public debt. Though it may not strictly 
correspond to the effect illustrated by Corsetti et al. (2013), it will mitigate our conclusion 
on the cost of consolidation when public debt is high.  
                                                          
8 We thank Pablo Hernandez de Cos for raising this issue.  
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Figure 2. Example of the value of the multiplier for public spending and taxes according to 
the output gap 
 
Note: 𝜇𝑚𝑇𝑚𝐺 = 1.5, 𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐺 = 0.6,𝜇𝑇𝐺 = 0.75, 𝜇𝑚𝑇𝑚𝑇 = 0.5, 𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑇 = 0.4, 𝜇𝑇𝑇 = 0.5. 𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖 = −3%, and 𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 3%. Values are 
supposed to be identical across countries. 
Source: OFCE. 
Beyond fiscal impulses which represent discretionary decisions (in % of GDP) on 
government spending and taxes, we compute effective fiscal impulses (EFI, based on public 
spending and taxes), as the ex ante cumulative real effect of current and past fiscal impulses 
at time t. Thus, with 𝜓𝑘 .𝜇𝑡−𝑘𝑗  (for 𝑗 = 𝐺,𝑇) the fiscal multiplier at time t of a fiscal impulse 
that occurred 𝑘 years ago, one has: 
(8) 𝛥𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑡
𝑗 = 𝜓0.𝜇𝑡𝑗.𝐸𝐼𝑡𝑗 + 𝜓1.𝜇𝑡−1𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−1𝑗 + 𝜓2.𝜇𝑡−2𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−2𝑗 + 𝜓3.𝜇𝑡−3𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−3𝑗 + 𝜓4.𝜇𝑡−4𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−4𝑗 +
𝜓5.𝜇𝑡−5𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−5𝑗 + 𝜓6.𝜇𝑡−6𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−6𝑗 + 𝜓7.𝜇𝑡−7𝑗 .𝐸𝐼𝑡−7𝑗  
(9) 𝛴𝐸𝐼𝑡
𝑗  = 𝛴𝐸𝐼𝑡−1𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡𝑗.𝐸𝐼𝑡𝑗 
Equation (8) ensures that the impact of a fiscal impulse depends on the fiscal multiplier 
that prevailed when the fiscal impulse occurred. Seven lags are retained to account for the 
possibility of long lasting effects of fiscal impulses. The total impact of a sequence of fiscal 
impulses is then computed using the accumulation of fiscal impulses times the multiplier 
(eq.(9)). 
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4. Public Debt and output gap dynamics under alternative 
compositions of fiscal adjustment 
We aim to provide simulations on the paths of public debt and output gap of Eurozone 
member states according to the path of consolidation and the composition of the 
adjustment under different scenarios.  
The baseline scenario incorporates time-varying fiscal multipliers and hysteresis effects, 
but does not introduce the risk premium effect on long-term interest rates. First, we take 
into account the observed amount of fiscal consolidation from 2011, which is the starting 
year for all simulations, and derive the public debt dynamics until 2034. We investigate 
whether, under observed fiscal stances, Eurozone countries may achieve the 60% debt-to-
GDP target.  
Then, we analyze different paths of consolidation with three alternative instruments: 
purely expenditure-based adjustment, purely tax-based adjustment and a mixed-
adjustment. Finally, in a third step, we introduce an endogenous risk premium.  
4.1. Public debt in 2034 under the current adjustment 
In the baseline scenario, we simulate the path of public debt-to-GDP ratios until 2034, 
which is the horizon of the 1/20th debt rule incorporated in the revised SGP and in the Fiscal 
Compact. The simulated path of public debt depends on the fiscal impulses which have 
been forecasted in the Eurozone from 2011 to 20169. We then assume zero fiscal impulses 
beyond 2016. Under this scenario, the fiscal multiplier is supposed to be time-varying as 
described in figure 2. Hysteresis effects are also introduced in the model so that a negative 
(respectively positive) demand shock will have negative (respectively positive) long-term 
effects on GDP. We suppose that sovereign spreads will vanish after 2015. Results are 
reported in Table 1 and hypotheses regarding the set of initial conditions are described in 
box 1. 
Columns (1)-(4) report public debt and structural balance respectively in 2020 and 
2034 (20-year horizon). 2020 is the year for which the output gap has returned to zero for 
almost all countries. The cumulative fiscal impulse for 2011-2016, is reported in column (5) 
and sums up the short-term fiscal stance for all Eurozone countries. Growth performances 
(GDP growth rates) are reported in columns (6) and (7). For GDP growth, we report the 
average growth rate over the period for which we have information on realized fiscal stance 
(2011-2014). Beyond 2020, GDP growth converges to the long-term growth rate. 
 
                                                          
9 For 2015 and 2016, we consider planned fiscal impulses. 
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Table 1. Public finance and output performances under the baseline scenario 
 
 Public debt (% of GDP) Structural balance (% of 
GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) Sovereign 
yield (%) 
 (1) 
2020 
(2) 
2034 
(3) 
2020 
(4) 
2034 
(5) 
2011-2016* 
(6) 
2011-2014 
(7) 
2015-2034 
(8) 
2012-2018 
Germany 51 6 1,9 3,0 -1.8 1,5 1,1 1,9 
France 93 99 -3,1 -3,9 -2.5 0,8 1,6 2,3 
Italy 112 57 1,1 2,9 -2.1 -0,8 0,5 3,4 
Spain 92 71 -1,4 -1,0 -5.7 -0,4 1,7 3,3 
Netherlands 71 66 -1,6 -1,8 -2.3 0,0 1,5 2,1 
Belgium 86 52 -0,3 0,5 -1.1 0,8 1,7 2,4 
Portugal 115 83 -1,0 -0,2 -7.4 -1,4 1,4 3,2 
Ireland 82 8 2,4 4,6 -6.3 1,5 2,2 2,8 
Greece 148 58 1,7 4,9 -11.1 -4,8 1,7 3,4 
Finland 65 74 -2,3 -3,3 -1.8 0,1 1,9 2,1 
Austria 69 56 -1,1 -1,0 0.3 1,3 1,5 2,2 
Eurozone 82 54 -0,3 0,2 -2.8 0,4 1,3 2,6 
Source: iAGS model 
*: Fiscal impulses are null beyond 2016. 
 
Given initial conditions and realized and expected fiscal impulses, table 1 shows that 
public debt would significantly decrease between 2020 and 2034 for all countries but 
France and Finland. Moreover, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Greece and Austria would 
meet the 60% target by 2034.  
In 2020, despite substantial fiscal efforts, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Finland and Austria would not be able to bring their cyclically-adjusted deficit under the 
Fiscal Compact limit of 0.5% of GDP. Among these countries, France, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Finland would not comply with the fiscal rule on public debt and 
would stand above the 60 % threshold in 2034 despite their fiscal efforts to bring back debt 
to this ratio.  
Finally, the baseline scenario questions the issue of public debt sustainability in the 
Eurozone. Sustainability is assessed regarding the ability of countries to meet the objective 
of bringing back the debt ratio to 60 % of GDP by 2034, consistently with the recent fiscal 
framework which fixes a 20-year horizon for assessing debt evolution. Sustainability refers 
to the ability of the general government to pay back its domestic debt. Its ability depends 
on the future available scope for spending cuts and tax hikes, but also on future economic 
growth. Though some countries in our baseline simulations do not reach this 60% 
threshold, it is noticeable that they achieve substantial reductions in public debt-to-GDP 
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ratios. This downward trend in public debt implies enhanced debt sustainability stricto 
sensu. However the social costs as well as the cost in terms of fiscal balance could make this 
adjustment unrealistic (see Buiter and Rahbari, 2014). For Greece, Italy and Ireland, it would 
require structural primary surpluses close or above 3% of GDP for many years. This 
obviously questions the ability of these countries to maintain such a high primary surplus, a 
situation which has rarely been observed in the history of fiscal consolidations. 
For countries, where public debt would fall significantly below 60 %, it raises the 
opportunity to pursue a fiscal stimulus as existing fiscal rules state that public debt must 
remain below 60 %, hence leaving some possible leeway to expand in the future. One may 
consider that the baseline scenario is economically, politically and socially costly: it goes 
beyond the requirements of fiscal sustainability, beyond the requirements of EU fiscal rules 
and beyond the social resilience of European citizens. For Germany, the primary surplus 
would reach 3.0% by 2034 under the current scenario. As the optimal level of public debt 
is unknown a priori, there is no reason to consider that this situation will correspond to a 
long-term equilibrium. The German government may decide to expand fiscal policy in the 
years after 2016.10  
It must be acknowledged that the projections can be sensitive to alternative hypotheses. 
Blot and al. (2014a) notably show that the value of fiscal multipliers and the hysteresis 
effect play a significant role to gauge the dynamics of public debt. Initial output gap and 
long-term growth are also critical hypotheses.11 Fiscal impulses have been high for most of 
Eurozone countries and sometimes exceeding 5% in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. 
They may be even larger if years 2015 and 2016 are excluded as the fiscal stance would 
turn positive for some countries according to AMECO forecasts (see table 3). For most 
countries average growth rates have been low during the 2011-2014 period. It must be 
recalled that over these years, the model has been calibrated to mimic the observed growth, 
public debt, public balance and interest rates. Thereafter, due to less contractionary or even 
expansionary fiscal impulses in 2015 and 2016, GDP would recover faster: Eurozone growth 
rate would reach 1.3% and 2.9% respectively. It would also result from a more 
expansionary monetary policy and to the error correction effect introduced in the model. 
Box 1: Main hypotheses for the baseline simulations 
All simulations begin in 2011. To do so, we need to set starting point values in 2010 for 
some key variables. Output gaps for 2010 come from OECD database. We have taken the 
                                                          
10 Blanchard et al. (2014) report the different channels through which a fiscal stimulus in Germany may be fruitful 
in the periphery. In’t Veld (2013) reports a positive impact of a fiscal stimulus in Eurozone surplus countries (e.g. 
Germany) but does not report a comparison with a fiscal stimulus in deficit countries. Blot et al. (2014a) show that 
such a fiscal stimulus in Germany, which would not jeopardize public debt sustainability, would be less effective 
than if it happened in Spain: the almost close output gap in Germany does neither favor a strong impact of fiscal 
policy in Germany nor in the Eurozone via spillover effects.   
11 Simulations also depend on starting debt levels. In the present context, however, initial debt levels are actual 
ones, and cannot therefore be modified.  
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Economic Outlook 88 database (December 2010) which was the latest information 
available to policymakers when they decided upon domestic fiscal stances for 2011 and 
beyond. Output gaps are frequently revised and an alternative calibration might be to use 
more recent OECD estimates. Long-term projections for growth rates are OFCE 
hypotheses (see Table 2) where long-term growth is decomposed between the growth of 
the labor force and labor productivity. These hypotheses are necessarily open to debate 
but they may only be seen as exogenous projections since the model does not properly 
account for a long term analysis of the growth rate equilibrium. Concerning fiscal policy 
and budget variables, the main hypotheses are as follows: 
— Public debts and fiscal balances in 2010 come from Eurostat; 
— Fiscal impulses and the composition of the adjustment are taken from AMECO 
database (see Table 3). For 2015-2016, fiscal impulses are planned ones. Fiscal 
impulses take into account the one-off measures and correspond to the underlying 
primary cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance.  
— Sovereign spreads for 2015-2016 are supposed to vanish progressively in the baseline 
scenario. It is assumed that the announced ECB program of unlimited debt-buying on 
the secondary market (Outright Monetary Transactions, up to a 3-year maturity) has 
been effective and achieves its goal of bringing down interest rates for Italy and Spain. 
Regarding countries relying on the ESM (formerly EFSF) for debt financing, we assume 
that Ireland gets full access to financial markets in 2014, Portugal in 2015 and Greece 
in 2016. We discuss a scenario with endogenous risk premium hereafter. 
 
Table 2. Main hypotheses for 2010 
in % 
  Public debt Fiscal balance output gap potential 
growth 
Source Eurostat Eurostat OECD OFCE 
Germany 82.5 -4.2 -3.7 1.0 
France 82.8 -6.8 -3.3 1.4 
Italy 115.3 -4.5 -4.4 0.2 
Spain 61.7 -9.4 -6.5 1.4 
Netherlands 63.4 -5.1 -2.4 1.3 
Belgium 96.6 -3.8 -3.8 1.5 
Portugal 94.0 -11.2 -2.3 1.0 
Ireland 91.2 -9.1 -11.7 1.8 
Greece 148.3 -10.9 -7.3 1.5 
Finland 48.8 -2.5 -6.0 1.6 
Austria 72.5 -4.5 -2.5 1.4 
 
  Source: OECD, Eurostat and OFCE 
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Table 3. Fiscal impulses – 2011-2016 
in % of GDP 
 
  2011 – 2014 2015-2016 
 Expenditures Taxes Expenditures Taxes 
Germany -1.5 -0.7 0.1 0.3 
France -3.9 1.1 0.4 -0.1 
Italy -2.2 -0.5 0.5 0.2 
Spain -1.9 -4.1 -0.1 0.4 
Netherlands -1.7 -1.3 0.5 0.2 
Belgium -2.9 1.4 0.6 -0.3 
Portugal -3.9 -4.4 0.3 0.6 
Ireland -1.3 -4.8 1.7 -1.9 
Greece -7.0 -5.5 1.3 0.1 
Finland -3.9 4.0 -0.4 0.6 
Austria -1.6 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
Sources: OECD, Eurostat and AMECO. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Does composition matter? 
We assess whether countries can achieve the public debt target in 2034 by resorting to 
alternative instruments of consolidation. For the sake of simplicity and with regard to the 
literature on fiscal multipliers, we consider an instrument for which the fiscal multiplier is 
high, called here expenditure-based adjustment and the other for which the fiscal multiplier 
is low, called tax-based adjustment as emphasized in figure 2. 
For each instrument, we calculate a sequence of fiscal impulses over 2011-2034 and we 
assess whether or not the country achieves the target and what is the output dynamics 
under the adjustment. For simplicity, we set fiscal impulses at - / + 0.5 from 2011 on. 
Austerity (a negative impulse) is reversed once the public debt-to-GDP ratio falls below 60% 
in 2034. For example, Spanish public debt stands at 71% of GDP in 2034 in the baseline 
scenario. We start with replacing the 2011  observed fiscal impulse by -0.5 and then, by 
iteration, we introduce additional negative fiscal impulses of -0.5 until the debt-to-GDP 
ratio reaches 60% in 2034. Once the target has been reached, we introduce positive 
impulses insofar as they do not breach the target. 
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The ability to comply with the debt objective is analyzed separately with three 
instruments (expenditure-based, tax-based and mix-adjustment). In the mix-adjustment 
case, we consider that countries for which consolidation is needed resort to the instrument 
with the lowest fiscal multiplier (taxes) whereas countries where an expansionary fiscal 
policy is possible resort to the instrument with the highest multiplier (expenditures). In all 
cases, it is assumed that interest rates converge among Eurozone countries.  
First, with maximum yearly consolidation of -0.5% of GDP based only on expenditures 
from 2011 on (table 4a), only three countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) would not reach 
the debt target in 2034. For those countries the cumulative fiscal impulse would amount to 
11.5% of GDP. For France, the Netherlands and Austria, a significant additional amount of 
consolidation is needed when compared to table 1. In the case of Italy, reaching 60% with 
-0.5 point of consolidation per year would involve 3.1 points of consolidation which is close 
to the -2.1 that were realized between 2011 and 2016.12 For Germany, fiscal stance would 
turn to a positive figure reflecting the fiscal space of the country. With a neutral fiscal 
stance, Belgium would also be able to reach the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, it must be 
stressed that average growth would be significantly higher between 2011 and 2014, in 
comparison with the baseline scenario, thanks to lower requirements for consolidation. For 
the Eurozone as a whole, average growth would have been 0.6 point higher. The most 
striking difference would concern Greece, with an averaged recession of -0.9 instead of -
4.8. Yet it must be reminded that under this adjustment path, Greece would still be unable 
to reach the debt target. Under this scenario, the cumulative fiscal impulse would be 
substantially higher than under the baseline (incorporating observed and planned fiscal 
stances between 2011 and 2016), but since it would be spread over a longer horizon, the 
gains in terms of short-term growth would be relatively substantial, whereas the long-term 
costs would be minimal.  
Turning to the case of purely tax-based adjustment (table 4b), only Portugal would not 
comply with the debt target. Public debt would reach 92%, which is significantly lower 
than in the expenditure-based adjustment, where it stood at 150%. This scenario is 
certainly and not surprisingly better for all Eurozone countries since, needed adjustment is 
lower and consolidation is less costly. Average growth in the Eurozone would now have 
reached 1.2 between 2011 and 2014, with average growth between 2015 and 2034 similar 
with the baseline scenario.  
This conclusion certainly hinges on the assumption that the tax multiplier is always 
lower than the spending multiplier. Resorting to the instrument associated with the lowest 
multiplier in times of consolidation is optimal, all else equal. This is of course untrue when 
an expansion is possible. Thus, we consider a fourth scenario of mixed-adjustment (table 
4c). Here, countries with fiscal room for maneuver resort to expenditure-based expansion 
whereas countries implementing consolidation resort to tax-based adjustment. The 
differences with the pure tax-based adjustment are rather small. Public debt for Portugal is 
only reduced by 1 percentage point. Average growth for the Eurozone is 0.1 point higher 
                                                          
12 Here we also take into account planned consolidation or expansion for 2015 and 2016. 
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between 2011 and 2014 and similar on average afterwards. It must be stressed that the 
main country for which there is fiscal room for maneuver is Germany. Though it is the 
biggest Eurozone country, the spillover effects from a German expenditures-based 
expansion are found to be small (see footnote 10). 
Let us briefly return to the superiority of tax-based adjustment over spending-based 
adjustment in the model. It shall not be considered tautological. Indeed, the model 
introduces spillover effects via trade which do not modify the discrepancy between both 
types of adjustment: the adjustment with the assumed lowest real costs (tax-based 
adjustment) also produces the lowest spillover effects on partners, hence the lowest 
(negative) feedback effects from partners. However, the model includes a monetary policy 
setting which reduces the discrepancy: the adjustment with the assumed lowest real costs 
produces the smallest reduction in the nominal interest rate, hence the lowest 
compensation for demand. The argument that spending-based consolidation should be the 
preferred strategy during consolidation episodes drew extensively on the reversed 
crowding-out effect: a fall in expenditure would be followed by a fall in interest rate and a 
consecutive increase in private investment13. This argument is strongly dependent on the 
existence of the ZLB (unless the liquidity trap is driven by shock on households’ confidence, 
as in Mertens and Ravn, 2010): once the ZLB has been reached, spending-based 
consolidations cannot produce a compensating increase in private demand. Moreover, the 
higher the fiscal multiplier, the faster a ZLB episode is reached. Consequently, the time 
frame for a reversed crowding-out effect to happen is shorter under a spending-based 
consolidation than a tax-based one.   
 
                                                          
13 The argument is present in, e.g. Giudice et al. (2003) and Corsetti et al. (2013). 
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Table 4a. + / - 0.5 adjustment - expenditure-based adjustment 
 Public debt (% of GDP) Structural balance (% of 
GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-2014 2015-2034 
Germany 70 60 -1,1 -1,1 1,2 2,2 1,0 
France 95 60 -1,1 0,8 -6,8 1,4 1,4 
Italy 122 60 1,1 3,4 -3,1 -0,7 0,4 
Spain 127 100 -3,6 2,0 -11,5 0,1 1,4 
Netherlands 85 60 -0,6 -0,3 -5,0 0,1 1,4 
Belgium 87 60 -1,0 -0,2 0,0 1,7 1,6 
Portugal 160 150 -4,6 0,1 -11,5 -0,1 0,9 
Ireland 122 60 -0,8 2,4 -7,0 1,9 1,9 
Greece 163 110 -2,2 4,4 -11,5 -0,9 1,0 
Finland 58 60 -1,8 -2,4 0,9 1,3 1,7 
Austria 74 60 -1,4 -1,2 -2,1 1,1 1,5 
Eurozone 96 67 -1,1 0,5 -3,8 1,0 1,1 
Source: iAGS model 
 
Table 4b. + / - 0.5 adjustment - tax-based adjustment 
 Public debt (% of GDP) Structural balance (% of 
GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-2014 2015-2034 
Germany 72 61 -1,1 -1,1 1,0 2,1 1,0 
France 84 60 -0,9 -0,5 -4,2 1,8 1,4 
Italy 114 60 0,7 2,8 -1,7 -0,2 0,4 
Spain 111 60 -2,4 2,8 -9,2 0,6 1,6 
Netherlands 72 60 -1,3 -1,2 -2,6 0,6 1,4 
Belgium 88 63 -1,1 -0,5 0,2 1,7 1,6 
Portugal 142 92 -3,2 3,8 -11,5 0,4 1,0 
Ireland 105 60 -0,6 0,7 -3,8 2,6 2,0 
Greece 139 60 -0,4 4,6 -7,6 -0,2 1,1 
Finland 59 61 -1,8 -2,4 0,7 1,1 1,8 
Austria 71 60 -1,4 -1,3 -1,5 1,5 1,4 
Eurozone 89 61 -1,0 0,3 -2,6 1,2 1,2 
Source: iAGS model 
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Table 4c. + / - 0.5 adjustment - mix-adjustment (expenditure-based expansion and 
fiscal-based consolidation) 
 Public debt (% of GDP) Structural balance (% of 
GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-2015 2016-2034 
Germany 70 60 -1,1 -1,1 1,2 2,2 1,0 
France 84 60 -0,9 -0,5 -4,2 1,8 1,4 
Italy 114 60 0,7 2,8 -1,7 -0,2 0,4 
Spain 111 60 -2,4 2,8 -9,2 0,6 1,6 
Netherlands 72 60 -1,3 -1,2 -2,6 0,6 1,4 
Belgium 87 62 -1,1 -0,4 0,2 1,8 1,6 
Portugal 142 92 -3,2 3,8 -11,5 0,4 1,0 
Ireland 105 60 -0,6 0,7 -3,8 2,6 2,0 
Greece 139 60 -0,4 4,6 -7,6 -0,2 1,1 
Finland 58 61 -1,8 -2,5 1,0 1,3 1,7 
Austria 71 60 -1,4 -1,3 -1,5 1,5 1,4 
Eurozone 89 61 -1,0 0,3 -2,5 1,3 1,2 
Source: iAGS model 
4.3. Does credibility matter? 
The assumption that interest rates will converge across Eurozone member states was 
included in the former scenarios. Yet, recent experience has shown that countries with high 
public debt underwent a sharp loss of credibility which materialized in risk premia increases. 
This situation has induced countries to implement sharper consolidation to restore 
credibility vis-à-vis financial markets, a situation already described by, e.g. Guichard et al. 
(2007). Thus we consider scenarios with endogenous risk premia on sovereign debts, as 
shown in eq. (5)14. We focus on pure expenditure-based and pure tax-based scenarios. 
Results are reported in tables 5a and 5b, in difference with results reported in tables 4a and 
4b respectively. The endogenous risk premium, given by eq. (5) on the national interest 
rate appears in the last-but-one column of each table. It might not be directly compared 
with the sovereign yield given in table (1) as the scenario is not the same. The relevant 
comparison would be with tables (4a, 4b and 4c) where risk premium is zero by 
construction. It may also be stressed that a zero risk premium does not mean that there is 
no spread with the safe asset (here the German sovereign bond) as convergence is 
supposed to occur slowly in the model as explained for the baseline scenario. 
                                                          
14 Dewachter and Wouters (2014) introduce endogenous financial risk in a DSGE model via a perturbation-based 
approach, but they do not model either a multi-country setting or risk premia on sovereign bonds.  
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It should be straightforward that the ability to reach the debt target when there is an 
endogenous risk premium is lower because positive risk premium increases the debt burden 
and weighs down on growth, reducing the advantage of a smoother path of consolidation.  
In the case of an expenditure-based policy (table 5a), the introduction of a risk premium 
requires a sharper consolidation of 1.1 percentage point of GDP for the Eurozone, with a 
strong discrepancy between France (with an additional cumulative fiscal impulse of almost -
5 percentage points) and Belgium (with an additional cumulative fiscal impulse of +0.5). 
Despite stronger consolidation, the Eurozone average public debt increases by 5 percentage 
points of GDP, in comparison with the previous scenario, and Greece, Portugal and Spain 
are still unable to reach the debt target in 2034. Real GDP growth rates are almost similar, 
on average between 2011 and 2014 and between 2015 and 2034 though these average 
figures hide some real costs which may cumulate in output gaps. Indeed, in the case of 
France and Portugal, between 2011 and 2034, the negative output gap would widen by 16 
and 22 percent respectively. On average for the Eurozone, the output gap would widen by 
5 percent. Risk premia would be higher for France or Finland, compared to a situation 
without endogenous risk premium but yet sovereign spreads with German interest rate 
would still be close or above 100 basis points in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain between 
2012 and 2018. 
The real costs of a tax-based adjustment (table 5b) would be substantially lower than 
after a spending-based one, once a risk premium is introduced. The cumulative fiscal 
impulse would reach a mere -0.3 percentage points of GDP for the Eurozone, and the 
cumulative loss of output gap would be 0.5 percent. In this case again, risk premia would 
be lower compared to the expenditure-based consolidation but may still be substantial for 
France and Portugal. Finally the debt target would not be achieved in 2034 for Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. 
The response of sovereign spreads to increases in public debt in the simulations are 
quite in line with the literature which reports relatively low values, e.g. Gruber and Kamin 
(2012). Results of the simulations concerning the peripheral countries of the Eurozone can 
be brought close to the empirical conclusions of Schaltegger and Weder (2015), though 
they study only developing countries. They show that fiscal adjustments do not have a 
strong impact on the probability of default, and that a composition effect exists: spending-
based adjustments are not successful at reducing the probability of default, whereas tax-
based ones are. In a scenario of endogenous risk premia, spending-based and tax-based 
adjustments give almost similar sovereign spreads (they are a bit higher in the latter than in 
the former, though the difference is probably not significant), but public debt increases less 
in the latter than in the former case. A composition effect thus arises.  
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Table 5a. +/- 0.5 fiscal impulses - endogenous risk-premium - expenditure-based 
adjustment 
In difference with table 4a 
 Public debt (% of 
GDP) 
Structural balance (% 
of GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) Risk 
premium 
(pts) 
Cumulative 
OG 
 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-
2014 
2015-
2034 
2012-
2018 
2011-2034 
Germany 0 0 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0.1 0,9 
France 6 0 -1,0 3,2 -4,7 0,0 -0,2 0.9 -16,1 
Italy 5 0 0,2 0,4 -0,9 -0,2 0,0 0.4 -4,5 
Spain 7 32 -1,3 -1,8 0,0 -0,1 0,0 1.1 -6,4 
Netherlands 2 0 -0,3 0,4 -0,3 0,0 0,0 0.6 -1,0 
Belgium 0 0 -0,1 -0,1 0,5 0,1 0,0 0.0 2,9 
Portugal 12 102 -2,4 -9,7 0,0 -0,2 -0,2 1.4 -22,1 
Ireland 2 0 -0,2 0,3 -0,4 0,1 0,0 0.3 1,1 
Greece 0 0 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0.6 1,6 
Finland 0 0 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0.0 2,5 
Austria 0 0 -0,1 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0.0 1,1 
Eurozone 3 5 -0,4 0,4 -1,1 0,0 0,0  -5.0 
Source: iAGS model 
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Table 5b. +/- 0.5 fiscal impulses - endogenous risk-premium - tax-based adjustment 
In difference with table 4b 
 Public debt (% of 
GDP) 
Structural balance (% 
of GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) Risk 
premium 
(pts) 
Cumulative 
OG 
 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-
2014 
2015-
2034 
2012-
2018 
2011-2034 
Germany 2 2 -0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0.1 0,9 
France 3 0 0,0 0,2 -0,5 0,0 0,0 0.6 -0,5 
Italy 0 -1 0,0 0,1 -0,2 -0,1 0,0 0.2 -0,8 
Spain 6 7 -1,1 1,7 -2,3 -0,1 0,0 1.1 -5,2 
Netherlands 0 0 -0,1 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 0.1 1,6 
Belgium -1 -4 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0.0 0,4 
Portugal 10 42 -2,0 -2,4 0,0 -0,2 0,0 1.4 -7,6 
Ireland 1 0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0.2 2,4 
Greece 0 0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0.4 1,0 
Finland 0 0 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0.0 1,8 
Austria 1 1 -0,1 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0.0 0,5 
Eurozone 2 2 -0,2 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0  -0,5 
Source: iAGS model 
5. Backloading vs. frontloading  
In this section, we address the issue of frontloading according to the choice of 
instruments (expenditures or taxes). In the case of a frontloaded adjustment, countries 
implement the bulk of the fiscal consolidation early. This is clearly the choice that has been 
made in the Eurozone since 2011. Despite negative output gaps, Eurozone countries have 
engaged massive consolidation plan as emphasized in table 3 where it appears that for 
some countries fiscal consolidation between 2011 and 2014 exceeded 10 percentages 
points of GDP. On the one hand, under the assumption that fiscal multipliers are high in 
time of crisis, this strategy may be ill-designed, implying high output losses. It may even be 
counterproductive for very high value of fiscal multiplier since public debt is hardly reduced 
because of the feedback effect from bad growth performance. On the other hand, 
spreading (or postponing) the adjustment may undermine the credibility of government 
and trigger speculative attacks on sovereign debt markets. Interest rates would go up. We 
illustrate the trade-off between backloading and frontloading by comparing the scenario of 
+/- 0.5 percentage point of GDP with a scenario where the adjustment amounts to +/- 1 
percentage point of GDP. We keep on distinguishing between spending-based and tax-
based adjustments, and also retain the endogenous risk premium. As in previous scenarios, 
adjustments start in 2011 and are pursued until debt-to-GDP ratios reach 60%. 
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The frontloading strategy under a spending-based consolidation would substantially 
alleviate the debt problem in Greece, Portugal and Spain though in the former two 
countries, the debt target would remain unreachable in 2034, despite strong negative fiscal 
impulses. This setback is all the more unfortunate that it would be accompanied by a high 
real cost: Greece and Portugal would face a negative output gap of 3 and 4% per year 
during 20 years respectively. For the Eurozone, frontloading would be preferable to 
backloading in terms of public debt and real activity in the long run, at the expense of the 
short-run where real growth would be reduced by 0.4%.  
Frontloading under a tax-based adjustment gives better outcomes. All countries are able 
to reach the debt target in 2014 and in the Eurozone, the requirement to implement a 
contractionary fiscal policy is relieved by almost 1 percentage point of GDP between 2011 
and 2034. The cumulative output gap is improved by 2% during the same period. Relief is 
substantial for Portugal and Spain who gain 0.5% per year during 20 years. In the short-run 
however, there is a minor real cost with frontloading in comparison with backloading. 
It remains to be acknowledged that sovereign spreads are substantially reduced by the 
recourse to a frontloading strategy. In countries where interest rates spreads are high, like 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, the fall amounts to an average of 0.4 if consolidation is spending-
based. Stronger austerity measures means that the peak for public debt and the stabilizing 
primary surpluses are reached more rapidly reducing the risk premium. 
Table 6a. +/- 1 fiscal impulses - endogenous risk-premium - expenditure-based 
adjustment 
In difference with the scenario described in table 5a 
 Public debt (% of 
GDP) 
Structural balance (% 
of GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) Risk 
premium 
(pts) 
Cumulative 
OG 
 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-
2014 
2015-
2034 
2012-
2018 
2011-2034 
Germany 0 -1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 
France -10 -1 1,3 -4,1 5,4 -0,8 0,3 -0,8 16,8 
Italy -7 1 -0,3 -0,6 0,9 -0,3 0,1 -0,4 4,0 
Spain -4 -72 4,3 3,8 -1,9 -0,8 0,1 -0,3 -11,0 
Netherlands -10 1 -0,5 -0,9 1,6 -0,5 0,2 -0,6 8,2 
Belgium 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Portugal 10 -168 7,2 26,5 -23,0 -1,6 -0,5 -0,3 -93,3 
Ireland -6 0 0,7 -1,2 1,4 -1,0 0,2 -0,3 1,4 
Greece 18 -22 2,5 7,8 -11,5 -1,1 -0,4 0,1 -65,2 
Finland 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Austria -1 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,3 
Eurozone -5 -11 0,9 -0,2 0,8 -0,4 0,1  0,9 
Source: iAGS model. 
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Table 6b. +/- 1 fiscal impulses - endogenous risk-premium - tax-based adjustment 
In difference with the scenario described in table 5b 
 Public debt (% of 
GDP) 
Structural balance (% 
of GDP) 
Cumulative 
fiscal 
impulse 
GDP growth rate (%) Sovereign 
yield (%) 
Cumulative 
OG 
 
 2020 2034 2020 2034 2011-2034 2011-
2014 
2015-
2034 
2012-
2018 
2011-2034 
Germany 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 
France -10 0 -0,3 -0,7 1,0 -0,1 0,0 -0,6 3,1 
Italy -1 0 -0,1 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,2 
Spain -21 -7 2,8 -4,0 5,0 -0,2 0,1 -0,9 9,1 
Netherlands -3 0 0,0 -0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0.0 0,0 
Belgium 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Portugal -27 -74 6,1 1,4 2,1 -0,2 0,1 -1,0 10,0 
Ireland -5 0 -0,2 -0,3 0,3 -0,2 0,0 -0,2 0,2 
Greece -13 0 1,1 -1,6 1,8 -0,3 0,1 -0,4 2,2 
Finland 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Austria 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 
Eurozone -6 -2 0,4 -0,7 0,9 -0,1 0,0  2,1 
Source: iAGS model. 
 
There are two arguments which may make a frontloading strategy preferable to a 
backloading one. 15 The first one relates to uncertainty. Of course, if one knows today that 
the fiscal multiplier will be much lower tomorrow, backloading consolidation is always a 
superior strategy. But a question arises: can one be sure that the fiscal multiplier will be 
significantly lower in a reasonable number of years? As a matter of fact, if the lower 
multiplier tomorrow is not confirmed, backloading may make public finances worse, 
because it maintains the cumulative consolidation needs. The second argument relates to 
the political economy of reforms. It is hard to argue that newly elected governments in the 
future will or should commit to the commitments of incumbent governments. Hence, 
consolidation should be implemented as soon as possible.  
A counter-argument can be given by the baseline scenario (table 1): it shows that the 
real costs of a sharp consolidation when the output gap is negative are not negligible and 
produce a self-defeating strategy where public debts continue to grow in countries which 
implemented the most negative impulses.  
                                                          
15 We thank Pablo Hernandez de Cos for clarifying this point.  
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Conclusion 
Turning back to the questions raised in the introduction, it is time for answers. 
First, the simulations performed with the iAGS model showed that there have been 
quite substantial costs with the fiscal stance endorsed by Eurozone member states since 
2011. It involves unrealistic improvements in public finances which stop the recovery under 
way after the Global Financial Crisis. Meanwhile the model confirms that this fiscal strategy 
will be unable to achieve, or sometimes to improve, public finance sustainability. Second, 
the simulations show that a composition effect is at work. Despite an active monetary 
policy, but only until the short-run nominal interest rate hits the zero-lower-bound, 
spending-based consolidations are less effective than tax-based ones in terms of public 
finance sustainability; they are also more costly in terms of economic growth. Third, 
introducing endogenous risk premia does not alter these results, nor does the simulation of 
a frontloading strategy.  
The conclusion is that it is not only important to implement a fiscal adjustment based 
on the instrument associated with the lowest fiscal multiplier but also to neutralize the risk 
premium through an accommodative monetary policy. Our results show that fiscal 
consolidations do not prove themselves very effective at improving credibility. Indeed, 
though Spain or Greece implemented strong measures to reduce their public balance, risk 
premia kept rising in 2011 and 2012 and went down only after Mario Draghi declared that 
the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the Euro. 
The introduction of different shapes for the multiplier effect on tax and spending, and 
the inclusion of a banking and financial systems with frictions in the model are left to future 
research.  
Appendix - Calibration 
A1. Aggregate demand and supply 
We calibrate the error-correction equation stemming from equation (3) by 
distinguishing short run and long run effects of monetary policy and external demand on 
GDP. Long run effect of long term yields (´ l) is higher than the short run one (´ s), to take 
into account delays in the transmission of monetary policy. As for heterogeneity between 
Eurozone member states in the transmission of interest rate shocks, empirical literature has 
not provided very conclusive results to date. Peersman (2004) reports diverging results so 
that any calibration remains hazardous. We choose to avoid a strong heterogeneity, which 
is consistent with the convergence in the transmission process before the crisis emphasized 
by Boivin et al. (2008) or Barigozzi et al. (2014). Boivin et al. (2008) notably suggest that 
the effect of an increase in the interest rate is higher for Spain and Italy than for France and 
Germany. The effect of interest rate shocks is therefore supposed to be lower for “Northern 
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countries”. We set 𝛽𝑙 (the long-run impact of foreign demand on output) equal to the share 
of exports in the country’s GDP, and 𝛽𝑠 (short-run impact) equal to half 𝛽𝑙. 
Table A1. Calibration of monetary policy and external demand  
effects on output 
 𝜹𝒔 𝜹𝒍 𝜷𝒔 𝜷𝒍 
Austria -0.40 -0.60 0.29 0.58 
Belgium -0.40 -0.60 0.40 0.81 
Finland -0.40 -0.60 0.23 0.46 
France -0.30 -0.50 0.13 0.27 
Germany -0.30 -0.50 0.25 0.50 
Greece -0.40 -0.60 0.13 0.25 
Ireland -0.40 -0.60 0.50 1.00 
Italy -0.30 -0.40 0.14 0.28 
Netherlands -0.40 -0.60 0.40 0.79 
Portugal -0.40 -0.60 0.17 0.34 
Spain -0.30 -0.40 0.15 0.30 
Source: iAGS Model, OFCE. 
 
The critical point in calibrating the error-correction equation is to set the speed of 
convergence of output to its long run equilibrium. The speed depends on values of 𝜆 
(impact of variables in level) and 𝛼 (impact of past growth rate), which are set equal across 
countries. We fix 𝛼 at 0.1 and 𝜆 at -0.3. These values ensure that the speed of convergence 
of output to its long-run value is comparable under normal times to that of a standard 
DSGE model. With these values, the output gap is closed about 5 years after a shock. 
Concerning equation (2), long run effects on potential GDP come from hysteresis 
effects. The risk-premium effect depends on the sensitivity of the sovereign yield on public 
debt as described in eq. (5). 
Hysteresis Risk-premium 
𝑯 𝜿 
0.15 0.01 
Source: iAGS Model, OFCE 
The hysteresis effect parameter is fixed at 0.15 in order to obtain qualitatively similar 
impacts of transitory and permanent fiscal impulses on potential growth, as those obtained 
with QUEST III (see Blot et al. (2014a) for a comparison with QUEST III model). For the 
simulation, fiscal rules are unplugged and shocks occur on the share of government 
consumption to GDP ratio. 
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Public finances 
The most important parameter to set for public finances is 𝛷, the overall sensitivity of 
revenues and expenditures to the business cycle. To do so we use the European 
Commission estimates. To compute the average interest rate on public debt, we compute 
an average maturity (MAT) of public debts using national sources on public debt maturity 
structures in 2011. 
Table A.3. Calibration of public finances parameters 
 𝜱 𝑴𝑴𝑴 
Austria 0,47 8,1 
Belgium 0,54 6,8 
Finland 0,50 5,0 
France 0,49 6,9 
Germany 0,51 6,1 
Greece 0,43 11,3 
Ireland 0,40 6,9 
Italy 0,50 6,6 
Netherlands 0,55 7,0 
Portugal 0,45 6,1 
Spain 0,43 6,8 
Sources: European Commission (2005), OFCE. 
External trade and finance 
We set the sensitivity of imports to output gap equal to the share of imports in 
country’s GDP. The matrix of trade exchanges between countries comes from the Chelem 
Database for year 2003. 
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Table A.4. Calibration of the sensitivity of imports  
to output gap 
 𝜴 
Austria 0.5 
Belgium 0.8 
Finland 0.4 
France 0.3 
Germany 0.4 
Greece 0.3 
Ireland 0.8 
Italy 0.3 
Netherlands 0.7 
Portugal 0.4 
Spain 0.3 
Source: Chelem (CEPII). 
As regards the parameters of the Taylor rule, they are set according to Taylor (1993). The 
sensitivity of forward-looking expectations in long-run expected inflation is set at 0.82 
which makes the long-run nominal interest rate equal to 4% (see Shiller, 1979; Fuhrer and 
Moore, 1995). 
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